Libor is a survey-based measure of bank borrowing costs that plays a central role in fixed-income markets. There is an active discussion about how well Libor summarized funding conditions during the recent financial crisis. In this paper we match and compare bank Libor survey responses to two novel measures of borrowing rates: 1) bank bids at the Federal Reserve Term Auction Facility and 2) inferences of term borrowing from Fedwire payments data. We find that Libor survey responses broadly track these alternative measures between 2007-09, although Libor lies below them at certain times, particularly at the height of the crisis. Libor quotes are also less diffuse than rates from the matched TAF and Fedwire data. We discuss a range of factors that could account for these differences. We also find that other public data beyond Libor are moderately informative about bank funding costs. *
Introduction
There is currently an active discussion about how well Libor (the London Interbank Offer Rate) summarizes bank funding costs, particularly during periods of stress such as the 2007-09 financial crisis. Libor is a survey-based measure of bank borrowing costs that is used to index some $360 trillion of notional financial contracts (source: British Bankers' Association, BBA), ranging from interest rate derivatives to adjustable-rate mortgages and corporate loans. Libor is also widely used in academic research, and market participants and policy makers rely on it to measure funding stress during crisis periods. Understanding the behavior of Libor is an important research topic, in light of the central role that Libor plays in fixed-income markets.
This paper presents new evidence on the properties of U.S. dollar Libor by comparing it to two novel micro measures of bank borrowing costs during the 2007-09 crisis period: 1) bank bids at the Federal Reserve Term Auction Facility (TAF) and 2) inferences of term borrowing from Fedwire Funds Service ("Fedwire") payments data. We analyze the size and direction of differences between Libor survey responses and these alternative funding cost measures over different phases of the crisis. We also study determinants of these observed differences, to help shed light on their cause. 1 Perhaps less well known is how Libor differed from other indexes of unsecured bank funding: the right-hand panel of figure 1 illustrates the significant dispersion (of up to 100 basis points or more) across measures of unsecured bank funding rates during this span. Measuring bank funding costs is challenging because interbank markets are relatively illiquid, and operate on a decentralized over-the-counter (OTC) basis. Reflecting these factors, Libor itself is not derived directly from actual loan transactions. Instead, the Libor fixing rate is computed as a trimmed mean of responses to a daily market survey, in which each member of a panel of large banks estimates the rate at which it could borrow on the interbank market at different maturities between overnight and one year.
1 Libor is a measure of banks' unsecured term wholesale borrowing rates. The maturity-matched OIS (overnight index swap) rate measures risk-neutral expectations of unsecured overnight borrowing rates over the same term. The difference between the two yields reflects credit and liquidity risk. An interbank loan exposes the lender to much greater risk because they transfer the entire loan principal to the borrower, unlike an interest rate swap. Note that while Libor is measured in 10 currencies, this paper focuses on an analysis of U.S. dollar Libor (i.e., the estimated rate on interbank loans denominated in U.S. dollars).
Figure 1: Spreads of Libor and Other Unsecured Bank Funding Rates over OIS
A range of factors could cause Libor to diverge from other measures of bank funding costs, particularly during periods of market stress. One issue highlighted by market observers is that term interbank markets become less liquid during crisis periods, making it more difficult for banks to estimate their own borrowing costs. A second issue is that markets become more segmented; for example the Eurodollar borrowing costs of a U.S. bank holding company's foreign subsidiaries may differ significantly from the unsecured borrowing costs of same firm's parent holding company or domestic commercial bank. A third aspect of the debate is the claim that Libor survey responses may in some cases have been misreported, perhaps motivated by signaling concerns given that Libor survey quotes are released publicly 2 (see section 2 for a more detailed discussion).
Our main empirical strategy is to compare individual bank Libor survey responses to two sources: 1) banks' bids in auctions for funds at the TAF, and 2) putative term loans inferred from data on banks' payments settled over Fedwire. We match these two sources to the Libor survey responses by institution, maturity, and calendar day. While these alternative measures could diverge in either direction from Libor, several important factors would be expected to lead interest rates measured in 2 For example, the Financial Times writes: "The Libor setting process is public and closely watched, so a bank that put in relatively high rate estimates could spark investor concern about its strength." ("Probe Reveals Scale of Libor Abuse," Financial Times, February 9, 2012) , while the Wall Street Journal writes: "Citigroup interest-rate strategist Scott Peng raised similar questions in an April 10 report, writing that 'Libor at times no longer represents the level at which banks extend loans to others.'… If any bank submits a much higher [Libor] rate than its peers, it risks looking like it's in financial trouble. So banks have an incentive to play it safe by reporting something similar -which would cause the reported rates to cluster together." ("Study Casts Doubt on Key Lending Rate, " Wall Street Journal, May 29, 2008) . Libor lies below these comparison series in the period after the Lehman bankruptcy, consistent with our micro regression estimates. Other public indexes, and particularly NYFR, also contain quantitatively modest but statistically significant incremental information for tracking movements in underlying bank funding costs, as measured by the term Fedwire inferences. This additional informational content may be partially due to the fact that the NYFR survey is conducted during the New York trading session, unlike Libor.
We also study the dispersion of funding rates measured in the TAF and Fedwire data sources, relative to Libor. Cross-sectionally, the distribution of Libor survey responses is significantly less diffuse than matched funding rates measured from either of these measures. Loan rates inferred from Fedwire become much more diffuse (normalized relative to the Libor fixing rate) at the crisis peak.
This result suggests that Libor, or any other aggregate market index, may become less representative of the funding costs facing any individual financial institution during a crisis period.
To sum up: overall we find that Libor co-moves closely with other indicators of bank funding costs during the 2007-09 crisis period, although these measures diverge much more around the crisis peak.
We conclude that greater market segmentation during crisis periods is likely to make any one market index, such as Libor, less representative of funding conditions facing any individual firm during such periods. A particular source of variation between Libor and our Fedwire inferences is that matched Fedwire transactions used in this paper are noisy inferences based on a statistical algorithm, not direct observations of interbank loans. The type of algorithm we use was first developed by Furfine (1999 Furfine ( , 2000 to study the overnight federal funds market 3 ; our analysis makes use of a new algorithm extending this approach to term transactions (see Kuo, Skeie, Vickery, and Youle, 2012) . As with overnight maturities, we emphasize that payment pairs identified by this approach may not correspond closely to actual interbank loans. The inferences from the algorithm may misclassify transactions as loans, may fail to identify some actual loans, or may misclassify the counterparties to some loans. As one robustness test, we compare the Fedwire evidence to results based on TAF bidding data, which is observed without error, and other public data such as NYFR. In general, our findings are similar across these approaches, although we also note some differences across them.
3 Results of this overnight algorithm have subsequently been used for a range of other research. Recent examples include Schoar (2011), Ashcraft, McAndrews, and and Ashcraft and Duffie (2007) .
We additionally note that the other comparison measures of funding costs we consider also have their own limitations; for example the interpretation of TAF bidding behavior is model-dependent, given that it reflects an indication of a willingness to pay, not the actual market-clearing interest rate paid by successful auction bidders.
The Controversy over Libor
Libor is the primary reference rate for the term U.S. dollar wholesale borrowing market. (Libor is published in 10 currencies in total; we focus on dollar Libor because of its importance and because our microdata measure U.S. Libor misreporting occurred during this period, given that other factors could also account for our empirical findings.
Factors affecting differences between Libor and other funding cost measures
This paper studies differences between Libor quotes and other measures of bank funding costs.
Below, we consider a number of reasons why such differences may arise, particularly during periods of market stress:
1. Libor is an offer rate. Libor measures the rate at which banks estimate they would be offered unsecured funds, not the rate at which they would accept those offers. Given the presence of a bid-ask spread, this would lead Libor to be higher than the average observed loan rate. When bid-ask spreads are large, such as during a crisis period, this difference will widen. For example, Brunetti, di Filippo, and Harris (2010) find using e-MID data that Eurodenominated interbank bid-ask spreads widened significantly during the 2007-08 crisis.
2. Imperfect internal capital markets. Borrowing costs may vary significantly amongst different subsidiaries of the same bank holding company, especially when comparing bank or nonbank subsidiaries, or legal entities domiciled in different countries. This reflects frictions in a bank's ability to transfer funds internally. A range of research in economics has documented these frictions in "internal capital markets" -in the case of commercial banking, flows of funds and capital across subsidiaries are also explicitly limited by regulation. For example, regulations require a bank holding company to act as a "source of strength" for its commercial banking subsidiaries, but limit the extent to which a banking subsidiary can support non-banking subsidiaries. These differences are important in our setting, since TAF bids were placed by commercial banks in the U.S. and foreign branches of banks operating in the U.S., which would be generally expected to have different dollar borrowing costs than UK-domiciled affiliates.
3. Borrower sample differences. The Libor panel consists of large banks, most of which are non-U.S. firms. Borrowing in the broader U.S. dollar interbank market includes a larger cross-section of banks, which may be of higher or lower credit quality on average than banks in the panel. For example, foreign bank organizations may have less access to domestic retail dollar funding and thus greater need to borrow in wholesale markets than domestic banks.
4. Lender sample differences. The Libor panel is asked to report the rate at which they can borrow from another bank. Bank wholesale borrowing includes funding from nonbanks such as money market funds, which may have less market power than large banks. This may affect the distribution of observed interbank rates. One way to test the importance of lender effects
is to attempt to separately analyze lending in federal funds, which is defined to be lending by banks or government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), from Eurodollar lending, which may originate from nonbanks.
Selection effect within the Libor panel. Even just restricting attention to borrowing by
Libor panel banks, the Libor fixing rate is based on a trimmed mean across all institutions, some of which may not borrow in the term interbank market on a given day. The banks that do borrow may have a lower or higher cost of funds than the panel trimmed mean.
6. Size effects. The Libor survey asks banks to report a rate at which they could receive funds "in reasonable size." Thus, traded volumes at smaller sizes, or very large sizes, may deviate from Libor.
7. Liquidity effects and hypothetical estimation. The term interbank market became smaller and less liquid during the financial crisis, as documented in Kuo et al. (2012) . This may make it more difficult for firms to reliably estimate their funding costs, generating noise in Libor. Thus, misclassification or measurement error could generate differences between inferred rates from these matched transactions and bank Libor quotes. While our TAF data is measured without error, bidding mistakes by banks could generate differences between these bids and matched Libor quotes.
The New York Funding Rate
ICAP developed its NYFR index of bank funding costs as a complement to Libor. It has been published since June 2, 2008. NYFR's methodology is modified from the Libor survey design in several respects: (i) ICAP does not publish individual bank reported rates or the set of survey contributors; (ii) NYFR is based on a larger set of contributors and collects midmarket rates rather than an offer rate; (iii) rates are measured at 9:15 a.m. EST, when the New York session is active and Eurodollar trading in London is most active; and (iv) the survey asks contributors to estimate market borrowing rates for a representative A1/P1 institution rather than the contributor's own funding costs.
NYFR also asks contributors to estimate the funding costs for a broader pool of unsecured funding instruments such as unsecured certificates of deposit and commercial paper, in addition to interbank loans, and from a broader range of lenders, including money market mutual funds and governmentsponsored enterprises, in addition to other banks.
In section 5, we compare Libor fixings to NYFR and to several other public indexes of unsecured funding costs. These include secondary yields on large uninsured CDs; a Eurodollar-funding rate reported by Reuters FT based on an electronic-screen broker quote; and the H.15 Eurodollar deposit rate, an offered broker quote reported in the Federal Reserve's H.15 report based on data from ICAP.
Data
Our analysis focuses on two distinct but complementary microeconomic sources of information on bank funding costs, which we compare to Libor and to other public indexes. First, we use individual bid data from the Federal Reserve's TAF. This facility relied on an auction mechanism to lend secured funds to depository institutions during the financial crisis. Second, we examine inferred transaction rates that banks paid in the interbank market, using an algorithm that matches transaction pairs from payments settled over Fedwire, the predominant U.S. dollar large-value payment system. Although these inferences are likely to be noisier estimates of bank borrowing rates than the TAF bids, they cover a broader time period and maturity spectrum and are available continuously throughout 2007-09, not just on specific auction dates.
For Libor-panel banks, we match each observation from these two data sources to the bank's corresponding individual survey quote for the same bank, calendar date, and maturity. This matching is done at the bank holding company level. 11 Our analysis then studies differences between banks'
Libor quotes and our matched microeconomic measures of funding costs.
Term Auction Facility
The Initially, $20 billion was allocated per auction, with a loan term of 28 days. At the crisis peak, up to $150 billion was allocated per auction, and funds were auctioned at both 28-and 84-day maturities.
Eligible institutions could submit up to two bids at each auction, each consisting of an interest rate and a quantity of funds desired. Funds were then allocated to bidders in decreasing order of the interest rate, until either the amount of funds to be allocated was exhausted or all bids had been filled.
A uniform-price auction mechanism was used (that is, each successful institution paid the same market-clearing interest rate, known as the "stop-out" rate, rather than its individual bid rate range of 3 to 13 panel banks. The average number of bids was 12.0, exceeding the number of bidders because banks were allowed to place up to two bids per auction. In cases where two bids were placed by a panel bank, our baseline analysis focuses on their higher bid, which reflects the bank's maximum willingness-to-pay for TAF funds. Our results are also robust to alternative treatments of multiple bids, however, as discussed in Section 6.
[Insert Table 1 here]
Bids placed by these Libor-panel banks provide useful information about banks' marginal cost of funds, which can be compared to the same bank's responses to the Libor survey for the same calendar day and loan maturity. As discussed in section 4, a bank's TAF bids are expected to lie below the rate at which they would be offered unsecured funds, as measured by their Libor quote, based on several factors and in particular because borrowing at the TAF requires pledging collateral, which is costly.
Note that our analysis focuses on banks' bid rates, not the auction stop-out rate. We do this because banks bid rates are likely to be a closer measure of their opportunity cost of funds. One disadvantage is that these bid rates do not represent the rate at which the bank actually received funds. This is because TAF was a single-price auction in which all successful bids borrowed at a common stop-out rate. In general, TAF stop-out rates lay below Libor, although there were a small number of auctions where this was not the case.
Fedwire inferences
Alongside TAF bids, we also analyze the results of an algorithm developed by Kuo et al. (2012) designed to identify term wholesale loans passing over Fedwire, the real-time gross settlement payment system operated by the Federal Reserve to settle large-value fund transfers among member financial institutions. Fedwire's membership consists primarily of U.S. domiciled depository institutions, including domestic branches and subsidiaries of non-U.S. banks; it also includes Federal Reserve banks, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the Federal Home Loan banks, the Bank for International Settlements, foreign central banks and certain other institutions and agencies.
The algorithm is applied to a dataset containing characteristics of each payment settled over Fedwire, including: (i) the identity of the sending and receiving institutions; (ii) the payment date and time;
(iii) the dollar amount sent; and (iv) a business function code indicating the transaction type, which can be used to help distinguish term federal funds loans from Eurodollar deposits. 13 Within these data, the algorithm identifies back-and-forth payment pairs whose characteristics are consistent with a term interbank loan. Specifically, the algorithm searches for a large round-amount payment, followed by a return payment on a later date for a slightly larger amount, such that the implied annual interest rate is a round number of basis points and the transaction meets certain other criteria. The approach is an extension to term maturities of the approach developed by Furfine (1999 Furfine ( , 2000 for studying the overnight federal funds market. This overnight algorithm has been used in a large body of subsequent research (e.g. Afonso, Kovner, and Schoar 2011; Ashcraft, McAndrews, and Skeie
2011; Ashcraft and Duffie 2007).
It is important to highlight that the output of both the Kuo et al. (2012) term algorithm and the Furfine overnight algorithm are inferences and do not represent direct data on term interbank loans.
Furthermore, it is difficult to fully assess the size of type I and type II errors associated with these algorithms that match pairs of bank payments as term interbank loans. Kuo et al. (2012) do present a number of validation exercises for the inferences of the term interbank loan methodology. For example, the distribution of loan rates from transaction pairs identified by the algorithm is shown to be tightly clustered around the Libor fixing rate in the period before the onset of the financial crisis.
This finding suggests the algorithm has a high signal-to-noise ratio in identifying related payment pairs. Even so, we emphasize that the transactions identified by the algorithm may not correspond closely to actual interbank loans, and that external validation of the algorithm is difficult.
13 Eurodollar deposits are predominantly dollar deposits held outside the United States but also include deposits with domestic nonbanks (e.g., domestic finance companies) and with U.S. depository institutions in segregated international banking facilities. Matching Fedwire data to a direct dataset on interbank loans from a broker, McAndrews (2009) and Bartolini, Hilton, and McAndrews (2008) show that a Fedwire business function code value of "CTR -Final beneficiary is not a bank" is highly indicative of a Eurodollar trade settled over Fedwire (as opposed to a federal funds loan). We use this identifier in our empirical analysis as an indicator of a Eurodollar loan. This identifier is also used in a similar way by Afonso, Kovner, and Schoar (2010) and several other papers.
The Kuo et al. (2012) into category (ii) or (iii), rather than a term federal funds loan falling into category (i). In our empirical analysis, we focus on transactions flagged as term federal funds loans, although our results are generally robust to also including Eurodollar deposits in our analysis sample.
We also note that this matching procedure infers only putative interbank loans settled on Fedwire.
While Fedwire is the primary U.S. dollar large-value payment system, a significant payment volume is also settled through the alternative platform, the Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS). Interbank loans may also be settled by a book transfer if the borrowing and the lending bank both hold accounts at a common bank. [Insert Table 2 here] Table 2 reports the number of inferred loans at different maturities, average one-month interest rates as a spread to overnight indexed swaps (OIS), average one-month loan size, and loan volumes at different maturities. 14 Perhaps most notably, the one-month interbank loan spread to OIS is only around 10 basis points before August 2007 but then rises strikingly, to an average of around 200 basis points during the peak crisis period, before subsiding.
Analysis of Panel Survey Responses
This section analyzes individual banks' responses to the Libor survey; specifically, we compare survey quotes to matched TAF bids and Fedwire inferences matched by bank, maturity, and calendar day. We estimate variations on the following regression equation:
P (Bid/loan rate ijt -Libor quote ijt > 0) = a + b. crisis dummies t + c. bank characteristics it + e , (1) for a Libor survey quote by bank i at maturity j on date t, where "crisis dummies" is a set of indicator variables for different phases of the financial crisis and "bank characteristics" includes determinants of the bank's expected cost of unsecured dollar funds (including the bank's CDS spread and a non-U.S. bank dummy), and lagged values of the "spread to Libor quote" variable.
As discussed above, there are many reasons why interest rates from TAF and Fedwire could deviate from Libor. However, we note that a number of factors would suggest a prior that TAF bids and interest rates on inferred unsecured loans settled on Fedwire would lie at least weakly below a bank's Libor survey response (i.e., "Bid / loan rate jit -Libor quote jit " would generally be expected to be a negative number). This prior reflects a combination of factors, as follows (note that the final two of these arguments apply only to TAF bids):
1. The Libor survey requires banks to estimate an offer rate (i.e., the rate at which counterparties would offer to supply funds). These offers would not necessarily be accepted if uncompetitive. For this reason, the offer rate will be an upper bound for their marginal cost of unsecured funds, or for the average rate on completed transactions, as inferred in Fedwire. 15 It seems likely that this gap between offer and midmarket rates would increase outstanding loan volumes (and would exactly correspond in steady state). A simple example: assume interbank lending consists of an overnight loan of size $1 and a two-day loan of $1, both of which are rolled over at maturity. Outstanding overnight loan volume is always $1, as is outstanding term loan volume. But term issuance each day is only $0.50, compared to $1 of overnight loan volume, since the two-day loan is rolled over only every two days. 15 For example, assume the unsecured offer rate for a particular bank in three successive days is 1.4 percent, 1.8 percent, and 1.6 percent, and the bank's willingness-to-pay for a positive quantity of unsecured funds (i.e., the yintercept of the bank's funding demand curve) is 1.5 percent. The average Libor quote in this example is 1.6 percent. However, the average rate on completed transactions is 1.4 percent, since the offer would be accepted only on the first trading day. On this day, the bank would borrow enough funds so that its marginal willingness-to-pay is 1.4 percent.
during the financial crisis, reflecting greater credit and liquidity risk during such periods (e.g.
as documented by Brunetti et al., 2010) .
2. TAF loans are secured, while the Libor survey measures banks' unsecured cost of funds. The requirement to pledge collateral for a TAF loan imposes an additional opportunity cost on the bank, relative to obtaining an unsecured loan in the interbank market, which would in turn reduce their willingness-to-pay.
3. Although the TAF is a single-price rather than a discriminatory auction, banks may still have incentives to bid strategically (i.e., to bid below their willingness-to-pay). This will be the case if there is a positive probability that the bank will be the marginal bidder at the auction and thus has a nonzero expected impact on the auction stop-out rate (see Armantier et al. 2011 for a more complete discussion of this issue). Table 3 presents results from estimating variants of equation (1) for both the TAF bid data and the matched Fedwire loans, including as explanatory variables a simple set of time dummies tracing out different phases of the crisis. 17 In each case, we estimate three specifications, where the dependent variable in turn is: (i) a dummy indicating whether the bid or loan rate exceeds the matched Libor quote; (ii) a dummy for whether this "spread to Libor quote" exceeds +20 basis points; or (iii) the spread itself.
Baseline results
[Insert Table 3 16 Moreover, TAF auctions were offered approximately only once every two weeks, whereas interbank loans could in principal be arranged on any day; furthermore, TAF auctions settled on a T+3 basis rather than the T+2 basis standard in the interbank market (Stigum and Crescenzi, 2007) . TAF may thus be slightly less timely as a source of liquidity, leading to a potential lower willingness-to-pay. 17 For the Fedwire analysis, we focus on maturities between one month and sox months, since these are the Libor terms most widely used for financial contracting. These maturities also form a large majority of overall Fedwireinferred term volume, as shown in table 2. corresponding Libor quotes, as do 80 percent of inferred term loans. Despite the magnification of interbank bid-ask spreads during this period, the average spread-to-quote becomes positive, based on both sources of results (it is +31 basis points for TAF and +21 basis points for Fedwire). Table 4 repeats this analysis, including two additional explanatory variables measuring banks' dollarfunding costs: (i) the bank's CDS spread; and (ii) a dummy for whether the bank parent is a non-U.S.
Correlates of Libor -borrowing cost spread
bank. The CDS spread is a measure of the bank's credit risk. The second variable is included because non-U.S. banks experienced shortages of dollar funding during the financial crisis, particularly after the failure of Lehman Brothers, when the euro-U.S dollar implied-swap basis spread regularly exceeded 100 basis points (Goldberg, Kennedy, and Miu 2010, see also Acharya, Afonso and
Kovner, 2012).
[Insert Table 4 . The spread-to-Libor quote is also larger for banks with high CDS spreads. We also note that the incidence of banks bidding above their matched Libor quote is significantly serially correlated.
This suggests these differences between bank bids and matched Libor quotes are somewhat persistent, rather than representing "one-off" bidding mistakes or other random factors.
Panel B repeats this analysis for the inferred Fedwire term loans. As with the TAF results, higher CDS spreads are also correlated with a higher "spread-over-Libor", and the "spread-over-Libor" is In both cases, figure 2 suggests that Libor quotes are more tightly clustered than the variation in underlying borrowing rates observed in the two microdata sources. This difference in dispersion is prevalent over the entire sample period in both datasets but is significantly magnified in the period after Lehman's failure. This could reflect the noise in these measures themselves (e.g. random variation in TAF bidding strategies by different banks), or other factors. In general these two series move together during the financial crisis, as shown in figure 1. However, as illustrated above, NYFR is elevated relative to Libor in the period after Lehman's failure. This is directionally consistent with the regression estimates from section 4 (i.e., the period directly after Lehman's failure). There are a number of explanations for these differences, as described in section 2. For example, NYFR is measured in the New York trading session, and includes a different set of financial institutions to Libor. Furthermore, NYFR is a midmarket rate, while Libor is an offer rate. 
Dispersion

19
To support this graphical evidence, we also estimate regressions similar to those reported in table 3, in which the rate differential of these alternative series (NYFR, secondary CD yields, Reuters Eurodollar, and H.15 Eurodollar) over Libor is regressed on a set of time dummies. Results are presented in table 5. Before the onset of the crisis, each of these comparison series actually lay slightly below the Libor fixing rate at both 1 month and 3 month maturities, by 0.3 to 3.0 basis points, respectively. The difference between them then flips sign and rises to between +0 to +18 basis points (depending on the series) in the period between Bear and Lehman and increases to between +31 and +134 basis points in the two weeks after Lehman's failure. (The NYFR-Libor differential 19 In particular, Wrightson ICAP (2008) writes: "One of the yardsticks that we and other analysts have used to evaluate LIBOR is the Eurodollar deposit rates published by the Federal Reserve on its H.15 report. Those rates are in fact produced by ICAP. They reflect the upper end of an indicative run that ICAP furnishes to data-vendors that is intended to capture the bulk of the rates paid by A1/P1 banks at any given time. With the high degree of dispersion in interbank rates at present, the bid-ask spread for that series is often set as wide as 15 or 20 basis points. The LIBOR fixings have at times appeared to be too low, but picking the upper limit of rates being paid by active participants almost by definition produces a rate that is too high." lies at the lower end of this range; here the differential is 34 basis points at a one-month maturity and 31 basis points at a three-month maturity.) The differential then declines, although the variation across these series is strikingly large even in the "after crisis easing" period, defined as November 12, 2008, to March 31 2009.
[Insert Table 5] Summing up, overall, this panel of rates moves quite closely over the crisis period. Observed differences between Libor and other unsecured funding indexes appear approximately consistent with our micro evidence from section 4 -namely, Libor is lower than these alternative funding measures in the period immediately following Lehman's bankruptcy. Interestingly, the spread of the secondary CD and Eurodollar rates over Libor actually flips sign (from negative to positive) between the precrisis to the crisis period. In other words, the patterns we observe are not simply a magnification of preexisting differences among these series.
Inferring bank funding costs from public data
Libor is often used by market participants and others as a public measure of bank funding costs. In this section, we compare Libor to a number of alternative publicly observable indexes, by analyzing how these different measures track movements in term funding rates inferred from Fedwire. We estimate variations of the following regression specification:
If Libor is a sufficient statistic among public indexes, we would observe estimates of b close to unity and the elements of the vector c close or equal to zero.
For this exercise, we compare Libor to NYFR, an index of secondary market CD rates, the BBB-AAA corporate bond spread, and a weighted-average index of bank CDS spreads. Our thought experiment is to consider an observer seeking to infer information about average funding costs using only publicly observable data. We estimate what fraction of loan-rate variation is captured by these public variables and which linear combination of these public indexes is closest (in a minimumsquared-error sense) to inferred transaction-level loan rates from Fedwire.
Results are presented in table 6. Our loan sample includes all inferred loans from Fedwire (not just the subsample where the receiving bank is a Libor-panel member), since our goal is to analyze how public measures move with term funding costs more generally. We focus on one-month and threemonth maturities.
[Insert Table 6 here]
Since NYFR is not available over the entire sample period, we exclude it from the first two columns of the table. Column 1 shows that wholesale loan spreads move almost one-for-one on average with the Libor-OIS spread. The Libor-OIS spread explains 61.7 percent of the spread variation at a onemonth maturity and 52.1 percent at a three-month maturity. Column 2 then adds other measures of funding costs to this specification. The secondary market CD spread and bank index CDS spread have the correct sign and are statistically significant, implying that these variables contain additional data about market conditions not reflected in the Libor fixing rate. The BBB-AAA spread is statistically significant but has the wrong sign.
Columns 3 through 6 focus on the subperiod since NYFR's introduction and include the NYFR rate as one of the alternative indexes. Comparing columns 3 and 4, we find that NYFR is somewhat more correlated with movements in Fedwire-inferred funding rates than is Libor, although the difference in R 2 's is slight (0.712 compared to 0.704 at a one-month maturity, and 0.533 compared to 0.525 at a three-month maturity). In addition, in examining columns 5 and 6, we see a smaller and generally statistically significant relationship between Libor and wholesale loan rates, after conditioning on NYFR (and other public data, in the case of column 6).
The set of market indexes we consider is highly correlated (e.g., in a principal-components analysis of the RHS variables from table 7, the first principal component has a weight of 97 percent at a threemonth maturity). However, these findings do imply that Libor is not a sufficient statistic for bank funding costs among the set of available public indexes. These results suggest that it may be helpful for policy makers and market participants to examine a range of funding-cost measures, rather than relying only on Libor, particularly in periods where different indexes diverge. Among the alternatives, NYFR appears most closely related to our microdata-based measure of funding conditions, likely because most term dollar loans settled over Fedwire (rather than CHIPS or another settlement system) reflect transactions from the New York session (Stigum and Crescenzi 2007) , the location of trade where the NYFR survey is also conducted.
Basis risk
During a financial crisis period, the cross-sectional dispersion of funding costs across banks is likely to increase sharply, making any marketwide funding index, such as Libor or NYFR, less useful as a measure of the supply curve for short term funds facing any given bank. To examine the quantitative magnitude of this effect, in figure 5 we plot a histogram of the dispersion of inferred one-week, onemonth, and three-month Fedwire loan rates, measured as a spread over the corresponding Libor fixing, during four different phases of the crisis. We do this for all banks, not just observations where the borrowing bank is a Libor panel member.
[Insert Figure 5 here] These facts are important, because Libor is widely used as an index for interest-rate swaps and other financial contracts because it is intended to closely track banks' cost of funds. Figure 5 , however, suggests this association becomes weaker during crisis periods; in other words, basis risk increases.
For example, consider a bank with a large portfolio of adjustable-rate loans indexed to Libor, which are partially funded via wholesale markets. Figure 5 suggests that, during stress periods such as 2007-09, such a bank may be exposed to significant basis risk between the Libor-indexed rate received on this loan book and the bank's cost of wholesale funding. 20 The volume of term activity also significantly declines late in our sample period, due to the bank liquidity provided by the introduction of interest on reserves and the buildup of excess reserves that accompanies the implementation of the Federal Reserve's Large Scale Asset Purchase programs. See Kuo et al. (2012) for further evidence on these trends in interbank volume as estimated by the output of our Fedwire term algorithm.
Additional Analysis and Robustness Checks
Amongst our filters, in our benchmark Fedwire estimates in tables 3 and 4, we drop transaction pairs identified as Eurodollar deposits, pairs where the sender is a foreign central bank, and loans less than one month in maturity. We have also reestimated our results relaxing each of these restrictions in turn. Our main results are robust to including Eurodollar deposits or foreign central bank transaction pairs. Interestingly, however, we find less evidence of a shift towards Fedwire loan rates above Libor quotes amongst loans less than one month in maturity. In other words, the trends discussed in Section 4 appear to be most striking for "focal" maturities of 1 month, 3 months and 6 months, which are the Libor maturities most closely watched by market participants.
As a further robustness check, we have also reestimated our TAF analysis including all TAF bids, in cases where a bidder placed two bids at a given auction (rather than just retaining the upper bid). This change in specification has no effect on our main finding from Table 3 that the incidence of observing bids above the matched Libor quote increases at the peak of the crisis. The fraction of such observations declines moderately, however; for example the fraction of post-Lehman TAF observations in which bid spread-to-Libor exceeds +20 basis points falls from 0.385 to 0.278.
As a final piece of analysis, Table 7 estimates a more saturated model in which the "non-U.S. bank" dummy is interacted with each of the six crisis-phase dummies. The table presents estimates for both the interacted and the noninteracted time dummies, since both are of interest. TAF results suggest that the "spread-over Libor" is higher and more likely to be positive for non-U.S. banks in phases 3, 4, and 5, from the failure of Bear Stearns until the end of September 2008. Correspondingly, the noninteracted time dummies for phases 2, 3, and 4 (which relate to U.S. banks) are much lower than the baseline coefficients in table 3. These results effectively imply that the overall upward trend in the incidence of TAF bids exceeding Libor is effectively concentrated entirely among non-U.S.
banks (i.e., there is no upward trend in the noninteracted time dummies from phase 2 to phases 3 and 4). These differences between U.S. and non-U.S. banks are not apparent for Fedwire, however, as already discussed in section 4.
[Insert Table 7 here]
Summary and Conclusions
According to our results, Libor tracks overall movements in other measures of bank funding costs during the 2007-09 crisis period, at least to a first-order approximation. We do find however that these measures diverge somewhat around the crisis peak. In particular we observe an increased incidence of Libor quotes that lie below matched TAF and Fedwire funding measures, particularly in the period directly after Lehman's failure in September 2008, and to a lesser extent in the six-month period between the collapse of Bear Stearns and Lehman.
As discussed in detail in section 2, there are a number of factors for why these different measures of borrowing costs could diverge. For example, the TAF provided funding to U.S. depository institutions, while the Libor survey is conducted in London, and thus likely represents the funding costs of a different legal entity to the commercial banking subsidiary bidding at the TAF. Some of these factors suggest that market segmentation and institutional frictions would lead the TAF and interest rate swaps and other contracts is motivated by the idea that it will be a good hedge for fluctuations in bank funding costs. Our results suggest this type of hedging strategy is likely to become less effective during periods of stress.
We also note that the use of market surveys similar to Libor is common in other OTC markets (e.g., consider the range of CDS indexes developed by Markit). Studying the statistical properties of such indices in these other markets would be an interesting avenue for future research. 
